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A COMPARISON OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN THE
UNITED STATES AND IN SOUTH KOREA
Sung Bae Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of limited liability for shareholders of the corporate
entity exists in nearly every developed legal system in the world.'
"Limited liability is probably the most attractive feature of the corpora-
tion although it has come to be recognized primarily during the 19th
century."2 The effect of limited liability is to protect the shareholder
from a loss greater than that of what was invested, and "to shift a sub-
stantial portion of the risk of business failure to creditors and away
from shareholders." 3
"While strong arguments can be made favoring the limited liability
principle, a line exists where the costs of limited liability outweigh the
public benefits. "4 When disaster strikes the corporation, and its assets
are insufficient to cover its liabilities, creditors and tort claimants will
clamor to disregard the corporate form. Exactly where the line is
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University of Iowa; LL.M., 1991, The Graduate School of Kon Kuk University, Seoul, Korea;
LL.B., 1986, Kon Kuk University, Seoul, Korea. The author wishes to thank Professor
Randall S. Thomas, College of Law, The University of Iowa, who contributed in an important
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1. LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATION LAW AND POLICY 241 (2nd ed. 1988).
2. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 130 (3rd ed. 1983).
3. SOLOMON, supra note 1, at 242.
4. Peter French, Parent Corporation Liability: An Evaluation of the Corporate Veil Doc-
trine and Its Application to the Toxic Tort Arena, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 605, 607 (1992).
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crossed from limited liability to some form of personal liability is un-
clear, but every jurisdiction in the United States espouses the view that
limited liability is not absolute.'
In South Korea, a civil law country, Art. 171(1) of the Commer-
cial Code provides for the corporate entity and Art. 331 provides for
limited liability for shareholders. 6 As limited liability is extensively
discussed in schools, arguments concerning the doctrine of disregarding
the corporate entity are centered around one man corporations and
closed corporations. Because it is possible to correct abuse of the cor-
porate entity through legislation, the Commercial Code was established
in 1962.1 There have been two cases dealing with the doctrine of dis-
regarding the corporate entity. It is one of the strong points in the civil
law system that the courts can make uniform application of law through
well-established statutes and thus, more effectively accomplish legisla-
tive policies.
This paper, in part II, gives an overview of the common law and
statutory doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in the United States.
Part III discusses the evolution of the doctrine of disregarding the
corporate entity in South Korea. The final part concludes with some
policy recommendations concerning the expansion of limited liability
doctrine in the United States and in South Korea. The paper will ana-
lyze the cases set forth by courts under the second theory for imposing
liability upon corporate parents or shareholders for the action of their
subsidiaries.
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Traditional Common Law
Under traditional corporate law doctrine, a court can pierce the
corporate veil of the subsidiary to hold the parent liable for the acts of
the subsidiary. This can occur when the subsidiary is formed to perpe-
trate a fraud.8 In the alternative, the court will pierce the veil where
the parent actively controls or dominates the subsidiary, such that the
subsidiary is the parent's "mere instrumentality" or "alter ego."'
5. Id. at 609.
6. SANGBUP (Commercial Code), Law No. 1000 of 1962, arts. 171(1), 331.
7. SANGBUP (Commercial Code), Law No. 1000 of 1962.
8. Lynda J. Oswald, Corporate Parent Responsibility for Environmental Liability of the
Subsidiary, in PROTECTING THE CORPORATE PARENT 122, 123 (Practicing Law Institute 1992).
9. Id.
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1. State Common Law
Corporate formation in the United States is purely a matter of state
law."0 The limited liability principle is stringently upheld under state
law. 1 State courts generally employ a two-pronged test when deciding
whether to pierce the corporate veil. 12 The first prong requires "such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist."' 3 The second prong
seeks to decide whether the acts are treated as those of the corporation
alone, for then an inequitable result will follow." Some courts also
require that retaining the corporate fiction will work an injustice on the
injured party, but this third prong seems to be inherently answered
under the second prong of the test, and thus may be superfluous. 5
In a classic corporate veil piercing case, DeWitt Truck Brokers,
Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 16 the plaintiff sought, "by pierc-
ing the corporate veil under the law of South Carolina, to impose
individual liability on the president of the indebted corporation individ-
ually."" At the outset, "the court recognized that a corporation is an
entity, separate and distinct from its officers and stockholders, and that
its debts are not the individual indebtedness of its stockholder."' 8 This
is expressed in the presumption that the corporation and its stockhold-
ers are separate and distinct.19 But this concept of separate entity is
merely a legal theory, "introduced for purposes of convenience and to
subserve the ends of justice, ' and the courts "decline to recognize it
whenever recognition of the corporate form would extend the principle
of incorporation beyond its legitimate purposes and would produce
injustice or inequitable consequences."2" Accordingly, "in an appro-
10. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 266.
11. Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 835, 855 (1982) [hereinafter Piercing the Corporate Veil].
12. Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 983 (1982).
13. Automotriz Del Golfo de Cal. S.A. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957); accord FMC
Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
14. Automotriz, 306 P.2d at 3.
15. French, supra note 4, at 611.
16. 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 683.
18. Id.
19. Fishman v. State, 197 S.E.2d 467, 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973).
20. Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Stockholder's Personal Conduct of Operations or
Management of Assets as Factor Justifying Disregard of Corporate Entity, 46 A.L.R.3d 430
(1972).
21. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distill & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1973), modified factually, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974); Sell v. United States, 127 F.2d
284, 288-89 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); Jennings v. Automobile
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priate case and in furtherance of the ends of justice," the corporate veil
will be pierced and the corporation and its stockholders "will be treated
as identical." 22 This power to pierce the corporate veil, though, is to
be exercised "reluctantly," 23 and "cautiously," 24 with the burden of
corporate fiction resting on the party asserting such claim.25
The circumstances that have been considered significant by the
courts in actions to disregard the corporate fiction have been "rarely
articulated with any clarity."26 Perhaps this is because the circum-
stances "necessarily vary according to the circumstances of each
case, "27 and every case where the issue is raised is to be regarded as
"sui generis and must be decided in accordance with its own underly-
ing facts. 2
8
The court in DeWitt Truck Brokers enumerated major factors that,
when addressed, shed light on the propensity of a court in equity to
pierce the corporate veil.29 One significant factor, which all the au-
thorities consider significant in the inquiry, and particularly in the
cases of one-man or closely-held corporations, is whether the corpora-
tion is grossly undercapitalized for the purposes of the corporate.3"
The obligation to provide adequate capital begins with incorporation
and is a continuing obligation thereafter during the corporation's opera-
tions.3 ' The other factors that are emphasized in the application of the
doctrine are failure to observe corporate formalities,32 non-payment of
Sales Co., 93 S.E. 188 (1917).
22. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §43 (1985).
23. Pardo v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
24. Country Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
25. Coryll v. Phipps, 128 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1942), aff'd., 317 U.S. 406 (1943);
Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Haynes v. Champagne Tile Corp., 228 F. Supp. 157, 159 (E.D. La. 1964).
26. Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. Auer v. Frank, 38 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1964); Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Stover, 327
F.2d 288, 291 (8th Cir. 1964).
28. Brown Bros. Equip. Co. v. State, 215 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
29. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 685-87.
30. Id.
31. James R. Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45
N.D. L. REV. 366, 377-78 (1969); Maurice J. Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Consideration
for the Benefits of Separate Incorporation, Nw. U. L. REV. 478, 495 (1958).
32. House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64, 66-67
(5th Cir. 1972); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975); Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. 1974); TSS
Sportswear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop (Guam), Inc., 380 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1967); Arnold v.
Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972); Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1975). While
disregard of corporate formalities is a circumstance to be considered, it is generally held to be
insufficient in itself, without some other facts, to support a piercing of the corporate veil.
Heating and Supply Co. v. Scherb, 432 P.2d 237, 239 (Colo. 1967); Revere Press, Inc. v.
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dividends,33 insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time,' si-
phoning off funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder,35
non-functioning of other officers or directors,36 absence of corporate
records,37 and "the fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders."38
The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may not, howev-
er, rest on a single factor, whether undercapitalization, disregard of
corporation's formalities, or any other single factor, but must involve a
number of such factors. In addition, it must present an element of
injustice or fundamental unfairness.39 "But undercapitalization, cou-
pled with disregard of corporate formalities, lack of participation on
the part of the other stockholders, and the failure to pay dividends
while paying substantial sums, whether by way of salary or otherwise,
to the dominant stockholder, all fitting into a picture of basic unfair-
ness, has been regarded fairly uniformly to constitute a basis for an
imposition of individual liability under the doctrine."4 ° "Though some
states apply the corporate veil piercing analysis more strictly than
others, the willingness of a court to pierce the corporate veil, and the
weight given to the above-mentioned factors depends, in part, on the
type of claim before the court."'"
2. Federal Common Law
Federal courts are permitted to formulate federal common law in
cases arising under federal statutes. 2 However, much of the corporate
veil piercing law suggests that the problems courts face are the same
whether the cause of action arises under state law or federal law.43
Because "federal law is not always applicable to cases in which there is
a question of whether or not to pierce the corporate veil, . . . some-
times state law applies."" But when federal interests are involved and
Blumberg, 246 A.2d 407, 411 (Pa. 1968); North Arlington Medical Bldg., Inc. v. Sanchez
Const. Co., 471 P.2d 243 (Nev. 1970).
33. Schoenberg v. Benner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1967).
34. TSS Sportswear, 380 F.2d at 516.
35. Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1971).
36. Financial Counsellors, Inc. v. SEC, 339 F.2d 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1964).
37. Lakota Girl Scout Council Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634,
638 (8th Cir. 1975).
38. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th
Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 687.
40. Id.; Delchamps, Inc. v. Borkin, 429 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. French, supra note 4, at 614.
42. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979).
43. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 3.01 (1991).
44. French, supra note 4, at 617.
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state interests are not especially strong, the "internal affairs" doctrine
of corporation law dictates that a federal court may be the proper
forum.45
"One reason the corporate veil piercing standard is more uncertain
under federal common law than state common law is that the Supreme
Court has not explicitly set a standard in this area." 4 The Supreme
Court first addressed the desirability of developing and implementing a
looser federal common law standard for corporate veil piercing in
Anderson v. Abbott. 7 The majority in Anderson gave approval to such
a standard when the goals and purposes of federal. legislative policy
would otherwise be avoided or undermined.48
The second Supreme Court case, First National City Bank v. Ban-
co Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,"9 represents a more cautious
approach to piercing the corporate veil. The court stated that "where a
corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a rela-
tionship of principal and agent is created, we have held that one may
be held liable for the actions of the other. ' In addition, the court
stated, "Our cases have long recognized the broader equitable principle
that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most
purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or
injustice.'51
Accordingly, the "lower federal courts have indicated different
degrees of willingness to pierce the corporate veil."52 The various lev-
els of willingness include: the conservative standard espoused in Board
of Trustees of the Mill Cabinet Pension Trust Fund for Northern Cal-
ifornia v. Valley Cabinet & Manufacturing Co. ;53 the middle-of-the-
road standard represented by United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.;'
and the liberal standard promoted by Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters
& Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v. Hroch5
The Ninth Circuit refused to pierce the corporate veil in Board of
Trustees of the Mill Cabinet Pension Trust Fund for Northern Califor-
nia using three factors: "the amount of respect given to the separate
45. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944); Piercing the Corporate Veil, supra
note I1, at 862-63.
46. French, supra note 4, at 617.
47. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
48. Id. at 362-63.
49. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
50. Id. at 629.
51. Id.
52. French, supra note 4, at 619.
53. 877 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985).
55. 757 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1985).
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identity of the corporation by its shareholders, the degree of injustice
visited on the litigants by the recognition of the corporate entity, and
the fraudulent intent of the incorporators." 56 After examining these
factors, the court concluded that, where federal jurisprudence was
lacking, it would "look to state law for guidance" in determining
whether to disregard the corporate form." 57 Under that standard, the
court refused to pierce the corporate veil even though the decedent
stockholder had commingled Valley Cabinet's assets with his personal
assets." The court found the plaintiffs had not shown the requisite
fraudulent intent by showing post incorporation misuse of the corporate
form) 9 The district court also found that the degree of injustice that
the litigants may suffer does not justify piercing the corporate veil of
Valley Cabinet. The "inability to collect [from an insolvent defendant]
does not, by itself, constitute an inequitable result."'
The Fifth Circuit represents a "middle-of-the-road" approach to
federal corporate veil piercing."' The court in Jon-T Chemicals devel-
oped a laundry list of factors to be used in determining whether a
subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent.62 These include whether: (1)
the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership; (2) the
parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) the
parent and the subsidiary have common business departments; (4) the
parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax
returns; (5) the parent finances the subsidiary; (6) the parent caused the
incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary operates with grossly
inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses
of the subsidiary; (9) the subsidiary receives no business except that
given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property
as its own; (11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not
kept separate; and (12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corpo-
rate formalities, such as keeping separate books and records and hold-
ing shareholder and board meetings.63 Additional factors that are
sometimes mentioned include: (1) "[w]hether the directors and officers
of [the subsidiary] act independently in the interest of that company, or
whether they take their orders from the [parent] and act in the
[parent's] interest[;]" and (2) the "connection of [the] parent's employ-
ee, officer or director to [the] subsidiary's tort or contract giving rise
56. 877 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at 772.
58. Id. at 773.
59. Id. at 774.
60. Id.
61. French, supra note 4, at 620.
62. 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 691-92.
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to [the] suit."' "
The court in Jon-T Chemicals found that the parent had given the
subsidiary millions of dollars in funds, the subsidiary was undercapital-
ized, and the parent and the subsidiary had used the subsidiary's prop-
erty jointly.65  The court also noted that "in applying the
'instrumentality' or 'alter ego' doctrine, the courts are concerned with
reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and the indi-
vidual defendant's relationship to that operation."' Therefore, the
district court pierced the corporate veil and held the parent corporation
personally liable, even though the subsidiary had followed all the rele-
vant corporate formalities.6" The court, however, did not require a
finding of fraud in tort cases, while holding that fraud is an essential
element of an alter ego finding in contract cases.6" "It thus appears
that whether the claim sounds in tort or in contract fraud is not essen-
tial to hold a parent corporation liable for the acts of its subsidiary".69
The Eighth Circuit, in Hroch,7 ° took the broadest and most liberal
position in applying a corporate veil piercing standard.7' In Hroch, the
trustees brought an action against the employer seeking specific en-
forcement of an agreement for allegedly delinquent contributions.
Plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold defendant
corporation's president liable for the delinquent payments. At the
outset, the parties agreed that because the case arose under section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act," federal substantive
law applied, although the courts might look to state law for guid-
ance.
74
In determining whether the corporate entity should be disregarded,
the court in Hroch approved the elements of the test established in
Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering.5 These elements are: "(1)
the amount of respect given to the separate entity of the corporation by
its shareholders; (2) the degree of injustice visited on the litigants by
recognition of the corporate entity; and (3) the fraudulent intent of the
64. Id. at 692.
65. Id. at 694-95.
66. 768 F.2d at 693.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 692.
69. French, supra note 4, at 622.
70. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1985).
71. French, supra note 4, at 622.
72. Hroch, 757 F.2d at 190.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
74. Id.
75. 605 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979).
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incorporators. "76
The court in Hroch found that: (1) the corporation had been dis-
solved for failure to pay occupational taxes; (2) the corporate record
keeping was inadequate; and (3) the corporation had failed to observe
various necessary formalities."7 The court also noted that Mr. Hroch's
deposition suggested that "he ha[d] used the corporate form in an
inequitable fashion to avoid its obligations and that unless judgment
[was] entered against him individually, the contributions to the Trusts
[would] never be made, resulting in a fraud on the Trusts." 8 In ap-
plying the test, the court stated that, "[b]roadly speaking, the courts
will disregard the corporate form whenever necessary to prevent fraud
or to achieve equity." 79 Moreover, the court emphasized its duty un-
der the federal standard to consider congressional policy demonstrated
in sections 306(a) and 306(b) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, and held defendant president of the corpora-
tion personally liable.8"
Even though Valley Cabinet, Jon-T Chemicals, and Hroch all
indicate that the federal law regarding corporate veil piercing is in a
state of flux, varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, all of these cases
are valuable because they indicate the need for a uniform federal com-
mon law standard for piercing the corporate veil in order to promote
federal policies and legislation."1 As the following section of this pa-
per will demonstrate, the cases determining the parent corporation
liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 2 serve as one of the
means that can be used to formulate a uniform federal standard in cases
involving federal statutory laws.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil under CERCLA
"CERCLA was enacted both to provide rapid responses to the
nationwide threats posed by the 30,000 to 50,000 improperly managed
hazardous waste sites in the United States, as well as to induce volun-
tary responses to those sites."83 CERCLA was enacted by Congress in
1980.' CERCLA was revised 5 by the Superfund Amendments and
76. Hroch, 757 F.2d at 190.
77. See generally id. at 190-91.
78. Id. at 191.
79. Id. at 190.
80. Id. at 191.
81. French, supra note 4, at 623-24.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-56 (1980).
83. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-56 (1980).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
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Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) .86 Section 107 of CERCLA im-
poses liability, in relevant part, for hazardous substance releases upon
"the owner and operator" or "any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of . ...""
Several courts have addressed CERCLA liability for parent corpo-
rations and their subsidiaries."8 The courts have broadly applied two
theories for "imposing liability for hazardous substance releases on
parent corporations or individual shareholders."8 9 "First, courts have
imposed liability where they found that the corporate parent was 'di-
rectly liable' under CERCLA because the level of its control and in-
volvement in the management of the responsible subsidiary is so perva-
sive as to render the parent a constructive 'operator' of that facility
under section 107 of CERCLA." '" "The second theory requires the
court, within its equity jurisdiction, to apply doctrines of alter ego
liability to determine whether the facts warrant piercing the corporate
veil to impose CERCLA liability on parent corporations or individual
shareholders. ""
Under the first theory, courts have found that such entities can be
held directly liable under CERCLA because of the level of their in-
volvement in the immediately responsible corporation or in operations
at the facility itself.92 "Under these circumstances, entities have been
found liable as present or former 'owner[s] or operator[s]' of the facili-
ty under section 107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, or as persons
'who . . . arranged for the disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous
substances . . . ' (i.e., generators) under section 107(a)(3) of
CERCLA."93 However, "if liability cannot be imposed on an owner
via operator liability, the only remaining avenue through which a plain-
86. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
88. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991); Colora-
do v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990); Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193
(E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985).
89. Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liabilily of Parent Corporations for Hazard-
ous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, in PROTECTING THE CORPORATE PARENT 77 (Practic-
ing Law Institute 1991).
90. John S.G. Worden, CERCLA Liability of Parent Corporations for the Acts of Their
Subsidiaries, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 74 (1993).
91. Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 89, at 77.
92. See generally, Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
93. Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 89, at 77.
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tiff may reach the parent is by convincing the court to exercise its
equitable powers to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary. "94
Since CERCLA and its legislative history offer no clear guidance
as to applicable rules of veil-piercing, several federal courts have
examined whether federal or state veil-piercing standards should prevail
in the CERCLA context.9 5 Even though the purpose of selecting fed-
eral common law as the rule of decision is to promote national unifor-
mity in the administration of justice under federal statutes, experience
under other statutes has revealed that federal courts have had difficulty
adopting uniform rules for veil-piercing.96 The following cases in this
section will examine the articulated standards and the ostensibly opera-
tive facts as to piercing the corporate veil in the CERCLA context. In
the first two cases, the courts ruled that the veil-piercing remedy is
unavailable, but in the remaining three cases found imposition of the
remedy appropriate.
1. Cases Finding Veil-Piercing Unwarranted
The district court in In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings97 considered the veil-piercing issue for purposes of assert-
ing personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation.98 Noting
that the federal common law emerged from the general principle that
"a corporate entity may be disregarded in the interests of public conve-
nience, fairness and equity," 99 the court articulated more specifically a
variety of factors: "(1) inadequate capitalization in light of the purposes
for which the corporation was organized, (2) extensive or pervasive
control by the shareholder or shareholders, (3) intermingling of the
corporation's properties or accounts with those of its owner, (4) failure
to observe corporate formalities and separateness, (5) siphoning off
funds from the corporation, (6) absence of corporate records, and (7)
nonfunctioning officers or directors."'" The court also recognized
that the policies underlying the statute in question would allow an
emphasis on the various factors examined when deciding whether to
pierce the corporate veil.
The court looked closely for "suggestions of pervasive control" by
the parent over its subsidiary's hazardous waste disposal policies, or an
indication that the parent treated the subsidiary as a "mere instrumen-
94. Worden, supra note 90, at 81.
95. Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 89, at 91.
96. Piercing the Corporate Veil, supra note 11, at 859-61.
97. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
98. Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 89, at 94.
99. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp at 33.
100. Id.
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tality" with regard to the hazardous waste of the parent."' In reject-
ing the plaintiffs' argument that the parent formed the subsidiary "with
an eye toward" limiting its own liability for environmental contami-
nation, "the court stated that the plaintiffs"' argument was rather re-
markable because it converted the very purpose for which the law
enabled investors to incorporate into an impermissible evil."'0 2 The
court found most important the absence of evidence that the parent ex-
ploited the subsidiary to "shield itself from potential CERCLA °3 lia-
bility" arising from hazardous waste activities other than those of the
subsidiary."' The court ruled that there were not enough factors "to
justify disregarding the corporate separateness" of its subsidiary, thus
veil-piercing was unwarranted."05
The district court in Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co."6 found
"no need to determine whether a uniform federal alter ego rule was re-
quired, since the federal and state alter ego tests were essentially the
same.""'7 Therefore, the court examined the "laundry list" of tradi-
tional common law factors developed by the Fifth Circuit for adjudicat-
ing veil-piercing issues.' 8 Finding the separateness in two entities,
the court concluded that there was an insufficient basis for applying the
alter ego theory to pierce the corporate veil."
2. Cases Finding Veil-Piercing Appropriate
In United States v. Mottolo," the court articulated two distinct
federal common law standards for piercing the corporate veil: a broad
and flexible standard applicable to achieve federal legislative policies if
the interests of convenience to the public, as well as the doctrines of
fairness, and equity so demand;"' and a federal alter ego doctrine if
there is a "substantial identity in terms of corporate ownership, man-
agement, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, and
supervision."1 2 The court noted that Mottolo had admitted that he
incorporated Service Pumping and Drain Co., Inc. to escape potential
personal liability by using the corporate entity as a shield.
101. Id. at 33-34.
102. Id. at 34.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-75 (1988).
104. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 35.
105. Id.
106. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
107. Id. at 226.
108. Id. at 227; United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985).
109. Joslyn Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 230-31.
110. 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
111. Id. at624.
112. Id.
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The court further noted that Mottolo and his wife, owned one
hundred percent of the corporation's stock, both were at all times the
sole owners of the business, the Mottolos made no personnel changes
even though a vast majority of Service's assets were transferred to the
new corporation, existing accounts were organized in the same manner,
they used the original equipment, and operated out of the same truck
transfer station as the original entity." 3 Examining these facts, the
court held, "as a matter of law that the difference in legal entities may
be disregarded insofar as CERCLA § 107 liability is concerned."" 4
The district court in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp."5 noted
Congress' intent that the federal government be immediately given the
tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the problems of
national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal, and that
those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful
conditions they create." 6 The court found relevant many of the same
factors as those imposing CERCLA" 7 liability on the parent as an
operator including: the parent's control over environmental matters; its
policy of approving all capital expenditures of greater than $5,000; its
stranglehold on income and expenses; its practice of placing the parent
personnel in the subsidiary's director positions, thereby precluding
other subsidiary executives from significant daily decision-making; and
its overwhelming control over the subsidiary's financial and operational
structure, which adds flesh to the skeletal proposition."' Finally, the
court ruled that the subsidiary's veil should be pierced to hold the
parent liable, not only because public convenience, fairness, and equity
dictate such a result, but also due to the all-encompassing control that
the parent had over the subsidiary as an owner.9
The district court in United States v. Nicolet, Inc. 2 noted "the
general principle that the appropriate occasion for disregarding the
corporate existence occurs when the court must prevent fraud, illegality
or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity would defect
public policy or shield someone from liability for a crime."'' The
court found that: the subsidiary formerly owned and operated the waste
disposal site; the parent held first a majority, and then all of the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
116. Id. at 23.
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
118. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 24.
119. Id.
120. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
121. Id. at 1202.
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subsidiary's stock; the parent actively participated in the management
of the subsidiary's operation at the site while a hazardous substance
was being disposed of there; and the parent was familiar With the
subsidiary's waste disposal practices and had the capacity to control the
disposal and resultant releases and abate damages from the subsidiary's
waste disposal practices."'2 The court concluded that the parent "was
an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA liability."' 23
The courts in the preceding cases applied different standards for
piercing the corporate veil in the CERCLA'24 context. However, the
courts pierced the corporate veil where necessary to further legislative
policies in CERCLA.'25 In these cases, rather than holding plaintiffs
to stringent traditional veil-piercing doctrines, courts emphasized haz-
ardous waste-related factors rather than traditional fiscal control fac-
tors.'26 However, as long as courts require proof that the subsidiary
is a sham or is used to perpetrate a fraud, the standard for veil-piercing
will be more stringent than for imposing operator liability under
CERCLA. 1
27
III. DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY DOCTRINE IN SOUTH
KOREA
A. Definition
As Article 171(1) of the Commercial Code provides for the corpo-
rate entity, 121 it endows a corporation with a separate legal entity dif-
ferent from its shareholders. The Article recognizes the existence of an
artificial entity as a separate legal entity and gives life to the artificial
entity as a "person."' 29
However, even though the fundamental notion of a corporate entity
is useful to modem society under capitalism, it sometimes can be used
by one-man corporations, family corporations, or parent-subsidiary
corporations, to avoid a legal duty, a contractual obligation, or to attain
any other unjust objective. For example, enterprising natural persons
have often used the artificial entity as a shield to protect their assets
from claims of persons who have dealt with the artificial entity. Thus,
if we are excessively attached to this legal formality under the civil law
system, it may lead to an unexpected, unwanted injustice and inequity
when we treat a corporate entity and its shareholders strictly as a sepa-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
125. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. at 1202.
126. Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 89, at 98.
127. Id.
128. SANGBUP [Commercial Code], Law No. 1000 of 1962.
129. Id. art. 171(1).
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rate subject of law under special circumstances. Therefore, if we inter-
pret Article 171(1) as recognizing the existence of the corporate entity,
it will clear up this legal deficiency and protect against abusive exer-
cise of legal rights. At the same time, this interpretation of Article
171(1) will allow courts to identify, in certain situations, the true na-
ture of corporate activity or identity, thus enabling courts to disregard
the corporate entity to accomplish legislative policies.
The majority of schools of legal thought are of the opinion that the
doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity is a legal theory. To these
scholars, this theory may legally allow, under the interpretation of
Article 171(1) of the Commercial Code, the courts to identify a share-
holder(s) behind the corporate veil with the corporate entity, not by
wholly denying the existence of a corporation's legal entity, but by
repudiating the function of the corporate entity in special cases."
The majority opinion's interpretation of Article 171(1) is based on ei-
ther Article 2(1) of the Civil Code,'' which provides for fiduciary
duty and good faith both in exercising rights and in performing duties,
or Article 2(2) of the Civil Code, 32 which prohibits abusive exercises
of rights. 3
However, because the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity
is an exceptional legal theory to limited liability and the nature of the
corporate legal entity, the doctrine should be applied only to the prob-
lems that can not be solved by the existing statutes or pre-established
legal theories or interpretations. In applying the doctrine, the majority
regards the following factors to be operative in practical cases: (1)
whether a debtor incorporates in order to evade execution by making
investment in kind of his entire property; (2) whether the person who
has a contractual duty of nonperformance incorporates in order to act
in the name of the corporation; (3) whether the purpose of incorpo-
ration is to avoid a covenant not to compete; and (4) whether a new
corporation having the same personnel and internal business structure
as the old corporation is used to escape punishment from the old
130. HONG Koo WOO, HYESABUP [CORPORATION] 20-21 (Seoul, Jinmyoungmoonhwa-Sa
1981); DON KAG SHU, SANGBUPICANGYEE (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW (1)] 265-66 (Seoul,
Bupmoon-Sa 1985); BYUNG TAE LEE, SANGBUP (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW (1)] 388-97 (Se-
oul, Bupwon-Sa 1988); HEE CHUL JUNG, SANGBUPHAK (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW (1)] 281-
83 (Seoul, Bakyoung-Sa 1989); EE SIK CHAE, SANGBUPKANGYEE (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW
(I)] 346-51 (Seoul, Bakyoung-Sa 1992); KEE SOO LEE, HYESABUP [CORPORATION] 91-102
(Seoul, Bakyoung-Sa 1993); Jo CHAN SOHN, SANGBUP (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW (1)] 397-
401 (Seoul, Bakyoung-Sa 1993); DOHNG YOUN JUNG, HYESABUP [CORPORATION] 22-33 (Se-
oul, Bupmoon-Sa 1993); TAE Ro LEE, HYESABUPKANGYEE [CORPORATION] 34-47 (Seoul,
Bakyoung-Sa 1994).
131. MINBUP [Civil Code], Law No. 471 of 1958.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 130.
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corporation's violation of law. '34
B. Effect
Once the corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation is treated
as if it does not have the legal entity in its materialized and specified
legal relation. 3' However, without any effect to the substantive cor-
porate existence, the limited liability doctrine is restricted only tempo-
rarily and partially to that relation. The effect of applying the doctrine
of disregarding the corporate entity is, in this respect, different from
the winding up or the termination of the legal entity that occurs in a
merger of corporations.' 36 Because the effect of applying this doctrine
is limited to the concerned material and its judgment, and thus is not
absolute to the world, plaintiff can make claims both disregarding and
assuming the corporate entity."3 7 As a result of the limited effect of
the judgment, even though the corporate entity is substantively disre-
garded, the standing of the corporation under the procedural law is not
affected by application of the doctrine.'38 Therefore, the corporate
entity is not "disregarded" as to other parties in their legal relation
with that same corporation.'39
C. Cases
In South Korea, the Commercial Code was established in 1962.
Only two Supreme Court judgments have dealt with disregarding the
corporate entity doctrine since this code was established.
134. See supra note 130; Seung Kyu Yang, Pyoungsuk [Annotation], BUPRYOULSINMOON
[LEGAL NEWSPAPER], Mar. 13, 1978, No. 1243; Dohng Youn Jung, Joosikhyesaui
Buphyoungtaeui Namyoungui Kyujewa Bupinkyukbooinui Bupri [Regulation of Corporate Legal
Form and Doctrine of Disregarding the Corporate Entity], 72 JUSTICE 152; HEE CHUL JUNG,
SANGBUPHAKWONRON (SANG) [COMMERCIAL LAW (1)] 260 (Seoul, Bakyoung-Sa 1980); Ryeo
Jin Kim, Bupinkyukbooinui Bupri [Disregarding the Corporate Entity Doctrine], 65 BUPJUNG
50; Byung Tae Lee, Bupinkyukbooinui Bupri [Disregarding the Corporate Entity Doctrine], 71
SAEBUPJUNG 43.
135. See supra note 130; Tae JoG Kim and Yu Kyoung Ko, Hyesabupinkyukbooinui Bupri
[Doctrine of Disregarding the Corporate Entity], in 7 BUPHAKNONCHONG 215 (Kyungbook
University, Daekoo, South Korea, 1991); CHANG HYUNG JUNG, HYESAUI BUPINKYUKBOOIN
[DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY] 58-59 (Kosikye, 1990).
136. JUNG, supra note 130, at 283.
137. KIM & Ko, supra note 135, at 215.
138. Chong Kwae Kang, Bupinkyukui Booin [Disregarding the Corporate Entity], in
HYESABUPUI JAEMOONJE (SANG) [THE PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS (1)] 33
(Bupwonhangjungchu [Office of Court Administration], 1987).
139. Id.; KIM & Ko, supra note 135, at 215.
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1. Judgment of September 13, 1977, 74-Da-954 41
In the case Judgment of September 13, 1977, the defendant incor-
porated X corporation, which was a one-man corporation in substance,
and took office as the chief director. X corporation owed the plaintiff a
great deal of money, but was insolvent. However, the defendant held
enough property to repay X corporation's debts to the plaintiff. There-
fore, the plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the defendant seeking to
collect his money.
The Seoul High Court found that the defendant illegally and
wrongfully followed the procedures in running the corporation, and
that the defendant held 100% of the shares of X corporation. 4' Not-
ing that X corporation was just an alter ego of the defendant, allowing
the legal entity of X corporation to be disregarded, the Seoul High
Court recognized the defendant's obligation of reimbursement. 4 ' The
defendant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court overruled the Seoul High Court judgment and
held that the High Court erred in finding that X corporation was just an
alter ego of the defendant and erred in disregarding X corporation's
legal entity.'43 Declaring that X corporation's procedures in running
the corporation was not illegal and wrongful in formality,'" the Su-
preme Court also noted that the fact that one man held 100% of the
shares of a corporation did not require dissolution under the relevant
Articles of Commercial Code.'45
However, there have been several critical arguments against this
Supreme Court judgment. First, the Supreme Court simply reversed
the High Court judgment and did not explain any standard for the
application of disregarding the corporate entity doctrine, and it did not
show the elements of disregarding the corporate entity.'46 Second, the
Supreme Court's notion that X corporation's procedures were not
illegal or wrongful in formality is not relevant to the doctrine. The
policy of this doctrine is to accomplish true justice in cases where,
even though the court has difficulty in finding a fault in corporate
formalities, the court can find that one man substantially ran a corpora-
140. Judgment of Sept. 13, 1977, Supreme Court, 74-Da-954 (South Korea).
141. Judgment of May 8, 1974, Seoul High Court, 72-Na-2582 (South Korea).
142. Id.
143. Judgment of September 13, 1977, Supreme Court, 74-Da-954 (South Korea).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Chan Hyung Jung, Bupinkyukbooinron [Theory of Disregarding the Corporate Entity]
in HYUNDAIMINSANGBUPUI YUNKOO [RESEARCH OF MODERN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW]
408-09 (1984); Kyo Chang Kim, Bupinkyukbooinui Bupri (Doctrine of Disregarding the Corpo-
rate Entity), in HYESARUPUI JEMOONJE [THE LEGAL ISSUES OF CORPORATION] 187 (1982).
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tion transacting business in the name of the corporation.'47
Finally, the Supreme Court's consideration that the recognition of
the one-man corporation does not mean the Supreme Court adopts the
doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity can not be any basis for
refusing the doctrine. If the Court does not recognize the one-man
corporation, the corporate entity no longer exists. By doing so, no
further discussion about disregarding the corporate entity would be
necessary. However, if the Court recognizes the one-man corporation,
as the Seoul High Court did in the instant case, there should be discus-
sion about the doctrine. Most cases of one man corporations are in-
volved with commingled property between the corporation and the
single shareholder. " This commingled property problem is, in fact,
one of the starting points used in applying the doctrine of disregarding
the corporate entity. Not applying the doctrine in the instant case, the
Supreme Court should have presented the basis for its arguments in a
more concrete and detailed fashion.
2. Judgment of November 22, 1988, 87-Daka-1671 4 9
In the case Judgment of November 22, 1988, C corporation of
Hong Kong, the owner of a ship, incorporated X corporation in Libe-
ria, Africa, in order to register the ship as a Liberian vessel. C corpo-
ration ordered the captain of the ship to get the ship repaired at Y
corporation in South Korea. As the captain gave an entrance notice, he
recorded C corporation as the owner of the ship. When the chief of C
corporation's Tokyo branch in Japan signed the repair contract with Y
corporation, he also recorded C corporation as the owner of the ship.
Assuming C corporation was the owner of the ship, Y corporation
repaired the ship and billed C corporation for the cost of the repairs.
When C corporation refused to pay the bill, Y corporation put the ship
under temporary attachment. X corporation, asserting its ownership of
the ship, brought a third party complaint against the temporary attach-
ment.
The Daekoo High Court, under original jurisdiction, found that X
corporation was incorporated by C corporation only to register the
vessel under the Liberian flag. The Court also found that X
corporation's complaint against the temporary attachment was intended
to avoid the contractual obligation under the repair agreement. The
Court recognized Y corporation's allegation that the ship's ownership
was an attempt to accomplish an unjust result. Additionally, the Court
held that Y corporation could temporarily attach the ship under Art.
147. See generally supra note 146.
148. JUNG, supra note 130, at 63.
149. Judgement of Nov. 22, 1988, Supreme Court, 87-Daka-1671 (South Korea).
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861(1)5 of the Commercial Code, which provides for creditors' rights
to an obligee in ship repair contracts.'50 X corporation appealed.
Finding that C corporation and X corporation have common direc-
tors and officers in the same office, the Supreme Court held that X
corporation's complaint was an attempt to avoid the application of the
law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that X corporation's com-
plaint was an attempt to release X corporation of any responsibilities
arising from the ship repair contract and was an abuse of the corporate
entity. 5' However, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the
Daekoo High Court's holding that Y corporation could temporarily
attach the ship. Citing precedent,'52 the Supreme Court noted that the
Daekoo High Court did not have to recognize the temporary attachment
because Y corporation already had priority on the ship and thus it
could preserve the obligation without temporary attachment.'53 Noting
that the Daekoo High Court judgment as to the temporary attachment
did not affect the decision of the instant case, the Supreme Court did
not put this in the holding.
As to this Supreme Court judgment, one opinion stated that the
Judgment of November 22, 1988, was the apparent result from apply-
ing the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity. 55 However,
there have been arguments against the judgment. First, because both C
corporation, founded under Hong Kong law, and X corporation, found-
ed under Liberian law, are foreign corporations, it is not clear whether
C corporation and X corporation should be recognized as legal entities
in South Korea. Furthermore, it is not clear whether C corporation is
the officer of X corporation. 56 Second, because C corporation's in-
corporating X corporation to register the ship in Liberia is approved by
the commercial convention concerning marine enterprising, the incor-
poration of X corporation should not lead the Court to conclude that
the purpose of incorporation was to avoid the obligation.'57 Third, if
this judgment is the result of the Supreme Court's application of disre-
150. Judgment of June 4, 1987, Daekoo High Court, 86-Na- 1100 (South Korea).
151. Judgment of Nov. 22, 1988, Supreme Court, 87-Daka-1671 (South Korea).
152. Judgement of July 13, 1982, Supreme Court, 80-Da-2318 (South Korea).
153. Judgment of Nov. 22, 1988, Supreme Court, 87-Daka-1671 (South Korea).
154. Id.
155. Dohng Youn Jung, BupinkyukbooineeronuilJukyongkwa Kuenku (Applying the Doctrine
of Disregarding the Corporate Entity), 11 BUPRYOULSINMOON [LEGAL NEWSPAPER], May 22,
1989, No. 1845.
156. We Do Kang, Bupinkyukbooinui BupriuiJukyongbumwewaJukyongyokun (Applying the
Doctrine of Disregarding the Corporate Entity), 223 PANRYEWALBO (MONTHLY REP.) 58, 58-
65 (Apr. 1989); Dohng Youn Jung, Bupinkyukbooinron (The Doctrine of Disregarding the
Corporate Entity), 226 PANRYEWALBO (MONTHLY REP.) 35, 35-36 (Apr. 1989).
157. Id.
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garding the corporate entity doctrine on a foreign corporation, the
Court seems to undertake a biased approach in applying the same doc-
trine. As evidenced in the Judgment of September 13, 1977, the Court
refused to apply the doctrine to a domestic corporation."'
IV. CONCLUSION
In the United States, the debate continues over the future of the
doctrine of limited liability. Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman have proposed that "if the case for limited liability turned
exclusively on questions of corporate structure or finance, . . . this rule
ought to be abandoned in favor of the basic policy goals of the tort
system."' 59 They, as proponents of pro rata shareholder liability,
have also examined several arguments." ° First, shareholders, no less
than other potential tort defendants, may attempt to evade tort liability
by hiding assets or by exploiting the limitations on personal liability of-
fered by bankruptcy law. Second, without careful attention to extra-
territorial enforcement, it would not be easy to implement unlimited
liability in one jurisdiction while other jurisdictions retained a limited
liability rule. The third non-corporate argument on behalf of limited
liability is one that is seldom made explicitly but is widely credited
nonetheless. "This is the claim that limited liability is a necessary
check on the expansionist tendencies of the courts in deploying liability
rules. "161
However, Professor Janet Alexander of Stanford Law School
argues that the proponents of proportionate shareholder liability "have
not discussed whether it is feasible to change to a regime of unlimited
liability or how such a change could be accomplished." 62 Professor
Alexander also argues that the proponents of proportionate liability do
not consider the possibility that no state could actually implement their
proposal, and that disregarding procedural issues leads to bad substan-
tive law. 163  Focusing on the procedural issues, Professor Alexander
first argues "that if law is to be used for social change, . . . procedure
needs to be in on the ground floor."'" "Second, it is important to
take procedure into account because procedural rules embody important
values - so important, in some cases, that the rules have constitutional
158. Id.
159. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1933 (1991).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens,
106 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1992).
163. Id. at 388-89.
164. Id. at 444.
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stature."' 65 Third, our world will never be an ideal world, "and one
of the tasks of procedure is to find ways to get closer to achieving
justice in our non-ideal world."' 66
Furthermore, Professor Joseph Grundfest, from a different point of
view, has stressed that capital markets can easily arbitrage around
shareholders' liabilities resulting from corporate conduct and can syn-
thesize limited liability pricing in a proportionate liability world.'67
Professor Grundfest has also proposed that policy makers must look
elsewhere for solutions to the problems purportedly created by limited
liability. 68
The basis of the arguments concerning limited liability in South
Korea stems from statutory interpretation. Article 171 (1) of the Com-
mercial Code provides for the corporate entity, and Art. 331 provides
for limited shareholder liability. 69 Several relevant statutes have been
established to promote legislative polices of these Articles. Thus, there
have been few situations calling for the courts to disregard the corpo-
rate entity in South Korea.
In contrast to the United States, where the courts have applied
piercing the corporate veil doctrine in many cases, South Korea, as a
civil law country, has established relevant statutes for such cases, and,
therefore, ambiguous situations occur less often in South Korea. The
abusive exercise of the corporate entity in South Korea can be correct-
ed by statutes and through legislation.
Although the limited liability doctrine does, in effect, shift some of
the cost of doing business to disappointed creditors, and thus away
from shareholders, the availability of limited liability through the cor-
porate form is the primary advantage of doing business in capitalism.
Limited liability in the corporate form can also be used in the interests
of economic expansion and democracy.
In the United States, the deficiencies of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, as an exception to the limited liability doctrine, can be
covered by more relevant and detailed legislation, similar to that pro-
posed for South Korea. Several federal cases indicate the need for a
uniform federal common law standard for piercing the corporate veil
and other cases involving federal statutes in order to promote federal
policies and legislation. Based on existing federal and state common
law related to piercing the corporate veil, the prospective statutes can
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See generally, Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capi-
tal Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992).
168. Id.
169. SANGBUP (Commercial Code), Law No. 1000 of 1962.
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work for the issues of piercing the corporate veil while preserving
deeply rooted legal traditions in the United States. Increasing public
criticism against the corporation in modem society will be also bal-
anced by these statutes.
